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I. INTRODUCTION: MISCLASSIFYING EMPLOYEES AS "INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS"
For a worker in today's economy, being designated an "independent con-
tractor" can mean many different things. On the most basic level, it means be-
ing treated differently than employees for tax and benefit purposes: Independ-
ent contractors are ineligible for the minimum wage, health and safety
protections, workers' compensation, disability insurance, and right to form la-
bor unions to which employees are entitled. Yet despite their ineligibility for
such work-related benefits, the independent contractor label is not necessarily
undesirable to all workers. Some workers, particularly those on the high end of
the wage scale, actively embrace the designation and the "free agent" lifestyle
to which it corresponds.1 For many other workers, however, the designation is
not so felicitous. In an era in which global competition has driven many com-
panies to convert permanent jobs into subcontracted and temporary jobs, work-
ers may find their once permanent jobs "reclassified" as independent contractor
positions with the attendant loss of benefits and protections. For these work-
ers, the label of independent contractor is thrust onto their work life involun-
tarily and can be the difference between receiving a living wage with the nec-
essary benefits and protections and working in a job that, because one must pay
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2002. My sincere thanks to Professor Jennifer Gordon, Cathy
Ruckelhaus at the National Employment Law Project, Larry Norton, and Becky Monroe, without whom
this Note would not have been possible.
1. Free agents can set their own schedules, work from home, work only part-time, and avoid the
less savory aspects of corporate culture, such as office politics, harassment, and hierarchies. Nina Munk,
The Price of Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, §6 at 52. See also Edward Lenz, "Contingent Work"
- Dispelling the Myth, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 755 (1995) (arguing that contingent work serves em-
ployee interests in flexibility, getting started in the job market, and providing a bridge between job loss
and new employment). Michael Lewis, The Artist in the Gray Flannel Pajamas, N.Y. TIMES, March 5,
2000, §6 at 45; see generally Daniel Pink, Free Agent Nation, FAST COMPANY, Dec. 1997, at 131. Evi-
dence of the appeal of this "free-agent" trend can be found in recent mass media coverage, such as this
March 5, 2000, issue of the New York Times Magazine entirely devoted to the new "free-agent" life-
style.
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for one's own health care, insurance and taxes,2 does not allow one to make
ends meet.
Employers have increasingly been turning to independent contractors as a
cost-cutting strategy. 3 In some situations, this shift to independent contractors
reflects a general restructuring of a company's workforce to meet new eco-
nomic pressures, outsourcing the labor supply of the company's "non-
essential" operations and retaining internal employees only for its "core com-
petencies." In pursuing this strategy, these companies have made a choice:
They have chosen to sacrifice control over the workers they call "independent
contractors" in exchange for the cost savings that accrue from eliminating the
tax and benefit burdens that those workers create. This choice is dictated by the
IRS, state courts and legislatures, who, realizing that employers have much to
gain from labeling their workers as independent contractors, have set limits and
tests on when a worker may be so designated.4
Certain companies, however, have attempted to cut costs using the inde-
pendent contractor label without making any sacrifices. They have tried to
"hire independent contractors" without significantly restructuring their
workforce or relinquishing control over the contracted workers. They have
achieved this goal through a simple verbal trick: labeling workers as independ-
ent contractors for tax and benefit purposes while still effectively treating them
as employees. While this practice allows companies to enjoy the best of both
worlds, it is illegal: it amounts to using the independent contractor category as
a loophole and leaves workers who ought to be covered by employer tax and
benefit programs stuck bearing the burden themselves. Understandably, the
IRS has not looked favorably upon such tactics, auditing companies with sus-
picious-looking income statements and suing those found guilty of such ma-
nipulations for back taxes.5 Nevertheless, due to the substantial cost savings
that companies can accrue from such tactics, the misclassifications continue in
fields as far ranging as the insurance and high-tech software industries to
2. Social Security and Medicare taxes for independent contractors is 15.3 percent of one's income,
double the percentage that employees pay. Munk, supra note 1, at 54.
3. "Today over 8.5 million workers are classified as independent contractors, comprising the fast-
est growing worker segment in the U.S." Ascend, Iomega and Novell Usher Trend Toward Outsourcing
Independent Contractor Compliance Management, BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 18, 1999, at 3, available in
LEXIS, News Group File.
4. While the specifics of the test vary depending on the adjudicatory body, the state, and the bene-
fits being claimed, the standard test used by courts and the IRS is some form of the I.R.S. 20-factor
common law test, which focuses on the question of whether or not the employer has "control" over the
worker. See infra note 10.
5. "The U.S. General Accounting Office estimated in 1996 that independent contractors reported
only 77 percent of their income, and questionable deductions submitted in 1992 left a $29 billion dollar
gap in taxes and government program funds. In order to recover these losses, Congress granted the IRS
in 1995 an additional $450 million and 600 people to support audits and the reclassification of inde-
pendent workers. Since then, the government has reviewed more than 1 million independent contractors
and reclassified 46 percent of the contractors to employees." BUSINESS WIRE, supra note 3.
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lower-paid service industries such as grocery delivering and home health care.
6
According to some studies, more than half of the nine million people who file
as independent contractors are currently misclassified, at a loss of some $20
billion a year to the government. 7 And as John McGucken, legal counsel for
Maryland's Office of Unemployment Insurance, describes, "It's in almost all
industries. The problem of misclassification is growing."
8
What makes this misclassification strategy so difficult to stop is that it
plays upon designations that are arguably subjective. The IRS and common
law distinctions between employee and independent contractor are notoriously
vague,9 requiring courts and agencies to make case-by-case determinations
analyzing some twenty different factors of a work relationship. 10 Depending
on how much relative weight adjudicators give to various factors, they can ar-
rive at different verdicts even when evaluating the classification of workers in
largely similar companies within the same industry.1" Such uncertainty of out-
6. In May 1999, a group of Allstate insurance agents sued Allstate for falsely labeling them as in-
dependent contractors and thus denying them reimbursement for business expenses. Andrea Foster,
Congress eyes contractor issue: Labor-backed bill would simplify test ofworkers' status, NAT' L LAW J.,
June 28, 1999, at BI. In a decision that garnered more media attention, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals ruled in 1997 that Microsoft had misclassified workers as independent contractors. Vizcaino v.
Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996). The employees are now entitled to valuable stock op-
tions and may be owed medical and pension benefits. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 173 F.3d 713 (9th
Cir. 1999). See also Daphne Eviatar, Same desk different deal: More full-time employees call themselves
'misclassified' in an age of contract workers. Behind the New Economy's big workplace conflict,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2000, at 11. The National Employment Law Project initiated a law-
suit in January 2000 against several grocery store chains in New York City alleging misclassification of
their grocery deliverers as independent contractors. Some deliverers were paid only $1 an hour, but the
companies maintain that they are not owed minimum wage because they are independent contractors. Id.
Maryland's Office of Unemployment Insurance recently found that a home healthcare agency had mis-
classified up to 500 home health aide attendants as independent contractors. Id.
7. Lawsuit Against Time Warner Could be Only the Tip of the Iceberg, Says Contingent- Workforce
Expert, BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 25, 1999, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Group File. In 1992, for in-
stance, a Government Accounting Office study estimated that the federal government lost approximately
$2.1 billion in payroll-related taxes each year that it could have collected from 3.5 million independent
contractors, whom were misclassified or failed to file tax returns. Mark McNally, Independent Con-
tractors Need Clear Status for IRS, CAPITAL TIMES, Mar. 5, 1997, at 5C.
8. Eviatar, supra note 6.
9. Marc Linder rails against the "so-called control test." Marc Linder, What's Black and White and
Red All Over? The Blood Tax on Newspapers-Or, How Publishers Exclude Newscarriers from Work-
ers' Compensation, 3 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 57, 69 (1997).
10. Some of the twenty factors used in the IRS common law control test are: (1) how detailed in-
structions are, (2) whether the company trains the worker or not, (3) how integrated the worker's serv-
ices are into the company's business operations, (4) whether the company and the worker have a contin-
ual relationship, (5) whether the company sets the worker's work hours, (6) whether the worker works
on the company premises or not, (7) whether the company tells the worker what order or sequence in
which the work should be done, (8) whether the worker is paid for time spent on the job or as a lump
sum or commission, (9) whether the company furnishes tools or materials, (10) whether the worker re-
alizes profits or losses, (11) whether the worker is making her services available to the general public,
and (12) whether the company can discharge the worker at any time. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296
(1987).
1I. See, e.g., Newspaper Drivers and Handlers Local Union No. 372 v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 116, 117
(6th Cir. 1982). This opinion reveals how different outcomes can even be reached by the same adjudi-
catory body over one fact pattern. As the opinion notes:
This is the second time this case has been heard in this court. After the first hearing, it was
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come gives companies the easy defense that even if certain factors suggested
that their workers were employees, they reasonably believed that their workers
were independent contractors. It is even possible that with such complicated
determinations, many employers are genuinely confused. Furthermore, while
these factors-which range from how detailed a worker's instructions are to
whether or not the company furnishes a worker with equipment-seem to be
evaluating objective concrete conditions, they actually offer room for compa-
nies skilled at verbal manipulations to craft interpretations favorable to them-
selves even when the facts seem to be against them. For instance, a company
can develop a policy of not calling the instructions it gives to workers "instruc-
tions," but instead, "a description of tasks" or "desired results." While such
manipulations may seem strained, companies have often argued them con-
vincingly enough to persuade courts to rule in their favor.12 As such situations
illustrate, verbal manipulations can be powerful tools to obscure the true nature
of work practices and mislead adjudicators. Stopping this practice becomes a
matter of picking apart the stories that companies tell, revealing how the labels
they assign to policies and people do not match up with reality.
This Note examines a novel approach to deterring the misclassification of
employees as independent contractors by utilizing state tort claims of fraudu-
lent and negligent misrepresentation to hold employers who have misclassified
their employees liable for denied benefits and unpaid taxes. This Note exam-
ines this approach in the context of the newspaper industry, whose long-
standing practice of labeling newspaper deliverers (or "newscarriers") as inde-
pendent contractors has in many instances been deemed a "misclassification"
by the IRS. 13 Utilizing this factual finding, a group of newscarriers in Ohio is
currently attempting to fight back against the losses they have incurred due to
this misclassification, and against the mislabeling practice as a whole. Their
claims and how the claims may be used as a general strategy against misclassi-
remanded by a different panel for a determination of whether or not the newspaper carriers in-
volved were as a matter of fact independent contractors or employees.
On review by the Board and by a divided two-to-one vote, the Board found, contrary to its
long standing previous policy, that newspaper carriers were employees .... The logic of this
reversal appears to be entirely related to a change in composition of the Board, since the fol-
lowing facts relied upon by the Board in its decision were all available at the time of the
Newsday decision.
Id. at 117 (citation omitted).
12. See, e.g., Neve v. Austin Daily Herald, 552 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. App. 1996) (holding that Neve,
a newscarrier, was not an employee of the Austin Daily Herald for reemployment insurance purposes
because, inter alia, the detailed descriptions provided to her-including the time by which she had to
make deliveries, the bagging procedures for inclement weather, and the order in which she should de-
liver papers-were merely "defining [her] task," and not indicative of the company's control over her.)
13. A LEXIS search of IRS private rulings revealed that between 1993 and 1996, the IRS charged
some 25 publishers with misclassifying their newspaper carriers as independent contractors. See e.g.,
Priv.Ltr.Rul. 96-40-012 (July 2, 1996); Priv.Ltr.Rul 96-39-061 (June 26, 1996); Priv.Ltr.Rul. 94-02-001
(Jan. 25, 1993).
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fication are detailed in Part III of the Note. It is the hope of these newscarriers
and workers rights activists that these legal claims, which force employers to
pay damages for their inaccurate statements, will make employers think twice
before abusing the independent contractor label as a cost-saving strategy in the
future.
II. THE "LITTLE MERCHANT" MYTH: THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY'S CAMPAIGN
TO LABEL NEWSCARRIERS "INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS"
The newspaper industry is in fact an ideal industry in which to test the
power of misrepresentation claims in counteracting the misclassification of
workers. To begin, it is an industry that actively promotes the idea that its de-
livery workers are independent contractors, even as workers, courts and the
IRS have challenged this practice. 14 Secondly, it is a practice that pervades the
industry, with over 90% of newscarriers being classified by publishers as inde-
pendent contractors. 15 Thirdly, its misclassifications have created serious in-
justice, with thousands of carriers being denied millions of dollars in tax con-
tributions, benefits, and workers' compensation in the instances where carriers
have been injured on the job. Lastly, the industry has engaged in this practice
for over a century, devising the myth of the "little merchant" in 1833 and
propagating it ever since. The newspaper industry is therefore a perfect study
in how sophisticated employers who wish to "have it both ways" will behave,
and the rhetoric that they will employ towards this end. If advocates are able
successfully to dismantle the fictions the newspaper industry has constructed,
they will have gone a long way in learning how to combat the practice of mis-
classification by other industries throughout the economy.
This section will detail the designation of carriers promoted by the news-
paper industry, how this designation does not square with reality, how the IRS
has attempted to crack down on these misclassifications, and the newspaper in-
dustry's efforts to fight back.
The Myth: Carriers as "Little Merchants"
The core of the newspaper industry's misclassification practice is the
14. Id; See also, Julius Duscha, On Many A Route, An Adult Has Taken A Child's Job, NEWSINC,
Sept. 27, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File. Although the Small Business Job Protection Act
[26 U.S.C.S. § 3508] has eliminated the threat of further IRS challeneges to publishers, state agencies
continue to challenge newscarriers' independent contractor status because it exempts carriers from
workmen's and unemployment compensation, and thus reduces state tax revenues raised by those laws.
Their status has also been challenged under other federal laws such as the National Labor Relations Act,
Fair Labor Standards Act, Americans with Disabilities Act and other civil rights laws.
15. According to a 1994 Newspaper Association of America survey, publishers treated only 5.9
percent of 451,378 child and adult newspaper carriers as employees. Altogether, 387,385 were consid-
ered independent contractors, 37,582 were considered delivery agents, and 26,411 were considered em-
ployees. 1995 Circulation Facts & Figures and Logic 13 (1995), noted in Linder, supra note 9 at 72.
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"little merchant" myth. 16 According to this myth, newscarriers are not em-
ployees of the newspaper, but instead, are independent sellers who buy papers
at wholesale rates from the company and then sell them to the public at a
profit. Because the carriers sell the papers to the public and are thus effectively
running independent businesses that can realize profits and losses, they fall
within the IRS definition of independent contractor.
The "little" in "little merchant" refers to the youth who, up until recently,
typically filled these jobs, the proverbial paperboy developing work experi-
ence, business sense and discipline through his morning or afterschool paper
route. Bound up in this myth is the notion that children do not need to be con-
sidered employees because they are not relying on these jobs for their liveli-
hood, and thus they justifiably fall outside the usual realm of labor, employ-. 17
ment and tax regulation. Another implication of the myth is that if we do
away with the paperboy's independent contractor status, newspaper companies
will not be able to afford them, and as a result we will be destroying an age-old
American tradition, a valuable rite of passage for budding entrepreneurs. For
example, as Senator Mike Enzi of Wyoming described in defense of a bill to
immunize newspaper companies from IRS misclassification crackdowns:
In Wyoming ... the IRS has taken after the last bastion of budding entrepreneurs,
our paperboys and girls. The agency is saying they don't qualify as independent
contractors, therefore newspapers would have to put them on salary, paying all the
benefits. Because of the added expense, newspaper readers go without the paper on
their front step and kids have to find another way to make a couple of bucks. Lem-
onade stands in Wyoming aren't very profitable in December. 
18
In other words, the independent contractor status of "little merchants" is crucial
to their survival as a job opportunity for youth. As newspaper companies are
well aware, this myth plays upon many cultural images and symbols popular in
the American imagination: the Horatio Alger story of the self-made man, the
ideals of "self-reliance, independence, responsibility, and perseverance," 19 and
the Norman Rockwell-esque image of the fresh-faced paperboy. While the
logic of this myth might be tenuous-indeed, what about being an employee
instead of an independent contractor prevents a youth from developing good
business skills and discipline?-the power and resonance of these images en-
courages one to overlook such gaps.
16. This myth is nothing new. See ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER IN AMERICA
261 (1937). See also WILLIAM THORN AND MARY PFEIL, NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION: MARKETING THE
NEWS 245 (1987) (noting that the little merchant system can be traced back to 1833, when publishers
realized that the system would "put all the commercial advantages on the side of the publisher, which,
[b]y demanding advance payment from middlemen... solved the delinquent subscriber problem and
assured regular cashflow," quoted in Linder, supra note 9 at 66.)
17. Linder, supra note 9 at 66.
18. Enzi Proposes Fairness to Tax Code, Congressional Press Releases, Federal Document Clear-
inghouse, Mar. 19, 1997.
19. Linder, supra note 9 at 67.
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A final portion of the myth asserts that newscarriers' independent con-
tractor status is critical to the economic viability of the newspaper industry.
This story alleges that newspaper companies operate on such thin profit mar-
gins that if companies were forced to consider carriers employees and assume
their tax and benefit burdens, they could not be economically competitive or
viable. 20 Such assertions fly in the face of much contrary evidence. For exam-
ple, two leading newspaper publishers, the St. Petersburg Times and the Wall
Street Journal, treat their 4,000 or so carriers as employees without any harm
to their economic viability and success.21 Furthermore, statistics reveal that the
newspaper industry continues to be one of the most profitable industries in the
nation, with profit margins that hovered between 14% and 17% throughout the
1980s and 1990s. 22 In spite of this evidence, the newspaper industry has man-
aged to convince adjudicators and legislatures through persuasive storytelling
that considering "little merchants" full employees would have devastating re-
sults for the newspaper industry, and thus is a step that is strictly to be avoided.
Tactics to Help Bolster the Myth
As these and the further examples detailed below begin to reveal, the "lit-
tle merchant" myth does not square with reality. And having been challenged
by the IRS on such discrepancies, the newspaper industry has realized that its
story does not always stand up to scrutiny. Thus to bolster and lend credence to
its story, it has made minor adjustments in the policies and language it uses in
an effort to make carriers appear more like independent contractors. Advised
by consultants, lawyers and newspaper association webpages that proffer ad-
vice on how exactly to tweak one's policies, publishers have attempted to fit its
practices into IRS-favorable categories.
Some of these adjustments truly relinquish a degree of control over the
carriers by attempting to "achiev[e] a defensible mix of factors enabling you to
prove independent contractor status," according to Michael Zinser, a Nashville
lawyer who specializes in independent contractor law as it affects newspa-
pers.23 But others are mere outward manipulations, either doing nothing to
give carriers the control they would have if they were truly independent con-
tractors, or only relinquishing control in word but not in deed.
A basic tactic many companies have initiated, for instance, is requiring
20. Newspaper companies advanced this argument, for instance, in 1995 when lobbying the Arkan-
sas legislature to exclude newscarriers from the state's unemployment assistance program on the
grounds that the workers were independent contractors. The legislature accepted this argument, stating
that such a measure was "immediately necessary in order to ... avoid unnecessary harm to newspaper
companies." Id. at 65.
21. Id. at 106.
22. Id. at 105.
23. Julius Duscha, On Many A Route, An Adult Has Taken A Child's Job, NEWSINC, Sept. 27,
1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
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carriers to purchase and provide their own plastic bags and rubber bands to
wrap newspapers for delivery. Such a step seems to satisfy the IRS control test
factor of companies not providing equipment to independent contractors. This
practice is suspicious, however, given that publishers often have strict guide-
lines for the type of bags that can be used, print their own bags and then "sell"
them to the carriers, or occasionally supply free bags and rubber bands as bo-
nus incentives to carriers who have performed well.24 These controlling fac-
tors seem to indicate that having carriers buy their own bags is simply to sat-
isfy the letter of the IRS standard, not to give carriers the freedom to use
whatever type of equipment that they, as "independent contractors," might de-
sire.
Another central but questionable tactic is the system newspaper compa-
nies have developed to compensate carriers. Publishers assert that the carriers
are purchasing papers from them at wholesale rates, and then re-selling them to
customers at retail rates of their own choosing in order to make a profit. This
scenario fits neatly into the IRS test factor of the company not compensating
the worker according to the time spent on the job, but instead for the comple-
tion of the task. It also satisfies the test factor of demonstrating that the worker
is responsible for his own profit and loss.
The actual compensation systems publishers have set up, however, belie
these assertions. To begin, one would think that if carriers were actually inde-
pendent contractors, publishers would have no need to worry about their
"compensation": as independent sellers, they would be responsible for gener-
ating their own compensation through sales profits. However, newspaper com-
panies seem to worry a great deal about carriers' compensation. As Eric Ro-
banske, circulation director for The Record Searchlight in Redding, CA,
reveals in Presstime, the Newspaper Association of America's trade publica-
tion, "Most newspapers have formulas [for compensation], but they're difficult
to structure and subject to a host of variables." 25 As the same Presstime article
describes, these difficult formulas include "var[ying] [the] wholesale rate based
on the profit potential of each route" as Gannett, one of the country's leading
newspaper conglomerates, does, or charging "uniform wholesale prices for
each newspaper" but "add[ing] subsidies based on route difficulty to ensure
appropriate levels of profitability," as in the practice of Knight Ridder, another
24. A District Manager of a group of newscarriers described this practice of providing free bags as
a "bonus" for good performance in posting he made to an online discussion group of newscarriers. Inde-
pendent Newspaper Carrier Resources Center, Carriers' Forum, District Manager forum (visited April
13, 2000) < http://paper-boy.hypermart.net/archive-forum/DistrictManagerSuggestions -20.htm>.
The "Supplies" forum of the same Carriers' Forum revealed that the Cleveland Plain Dealer sells bags to
its own carriers. Independent Newspaper Carrier Resources Center, Carriers' Forum, Supplies Forum
(visited April 13, 2000) < http://paper-boy.hypermart.net/archive-forun/suppliesl -20.htm>.
25. Barbara Z. Gyles, Carrier 2000: Today's distribution pressures preview even bigger challenges
in the next century, PRESSTIME, Mar. 1999, at 43.
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conglomerate. 26 Such concern for ensuring the "appropriate levels of profit-
ability" for the carriers seems odd, given the carriers' independent contractor
status, under which they should bear the risk of their own profits or losses.
Such inconsistencies and the very difficulty publishers have in structuring such
compensation systems makes one suspect that the systems are efforts to
squeeze newspaper practices into IRS categories that they do not fit.
27
Publishers and industry associations have also developed websites advis-
ing other papers on how to structure behavior so that nothing in the company
suggests that the carrier is an employee. One website, sponsored by The Inde-
pendent Newspaper Association, suggests numerous procedural safeguards to
use when dealing with carriers, including avoiding placing carrier recruitment
ads in "Help Wanted" sections, never using employment applications with car-
riers (but instead using vendor contract forms), and never distributing company
handbooks or "anything akin to 'work rules' that might be supplied employ-
ees. '28 "Be extremely careful with terminology," it states, "even casual office
language markets a thought process-i.e., evidence of intent." It warns that
"during an [IRS] audit, office managers, staff and independent contractors
themselves may be questioned about specific terms used in day-to-day opera-
tions," and in a telling statement, exhorts that: "These terms must not be simple
camouflage to hide real policies enforced; they must accurately reflect the true
daily relationship with independent contractors and the newspapers' staff." Fi-
nally, it suggests regularly reviewing the independent contractor concept at
staff meetings with anyone who has any contact with the carriers.
29
While one could construe these suggestions simply as legal advice on
how to stay within the bounds of the law, the length, detail and stilted nature of
the suggestions imply that publishers have something to hide. Indeed, the very
fact that employees have to be counseled about the words they use to describe
carriers or the ways in which they should interact with them suggests that their
natural inclination is to describe and treat carriers as employees. These awk-
ward policies, while saving some publishers from IRS detection, still do not
eliminate the fact that under a pure analysis of whether publishers actually
26. Id. at 43.
27. Eric Robanske also reveals in this article that publishers vary wholesale rates to make up for the
time it takes to complete certain routes. "'Someone might have 300 papers in town that [he or she] can
deliver in an hour-and-a-half,' says Robanske. 'Others can be in their vehicles for hours' on long or
cumbersome routes." To equalize the disparity, publishers charge the person on the longer route a lower
wholesale rate. Such an example illustrates how publishers, while ostensibly paying carriers for the
number of papers delivered (or according to their alternative story, not paying them at all but allowing
them to make profits from their own sales), are actually making what more closely resembles wage
payments tied to numbers of hours worked. However, since such time-based wage payments would
make the carriers look more like "employees" according to the IRS test, the publishers have come up
with this intricate system of "varying their wholesale rates." Id. at 43.
28. INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS WEBSITE (visited Apr. 14, 2000)
<http://www.newszap.com/ini/Files/contract/ic4.html>.
29. Id.
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control carriers, most adjudicators would find carriers to be employees.
The Reality: Carriers as Company-Controlled Employees
As these efforts by publishers suggest, the reality of a newscarrier's life is
a far cry from the "little merchant" myth. To begin, newscarriers are now more
likely to be adults rather than children.30 From 1980 to 1990, the number of
children delivering papers dropped 60%, while the number of adult carriers
rose 112%, and in 1996, the Newspaper Association of America reported that
adult carriers surpassed the number of kids for the first time.31 The shift to
adult carriers weakens the portion of the little merchant myth which holds that
carriers should not be considered employees because they are children and thus
outside the normal realm of tax and labor regulation. With a workforce now
made up largely of adult carriers, newspapers have a harder time successfully
arguing that they should be exempt from labor and employment laws, and as
publishers suspect, are now more vulnerable to IRS scrutiny.32 Rather than re-
treat, however, publishers have become even more aggressive in asserting that
carriers are not employees and have turned towards legislative protections, de-
scribed in the section below, to preserve the carriers' unprotected status.
Another reality of carriers' lives which challenges the little merchant
story is the way they are compensated. According to the compensation system
described above, carriers sell the papers and derive compensation directly from
the customers, made up of the difference between retail prices and wholesale
prices.33 However, this assertion flies in the face of the fact that increasingly,
customers pre-pay for their subscriptions through the mail or over the phone
(known in newspaper parlance as "Paid in Advance" or "PIA") directly to the
newspaper company,34 and have no interaction whatsoever with the carriers,
their supposed "sellers." While publishers have a pat explanation for this in-
consistency-that the papers are serving as mere fiscal agents for the carriers
and pass along the customer payments to carrier accounts-the simple deliv-
eries that carriers make to "customers" with whom they have never dealt seem
like strange sales relationships indeed.
A final irony of the true newscarrier situation is that publishers are having
30. This shift is the result of a number of factors: the growing heft and weight of larger papers
which youth on bicycles have difficulty handling, a trend towards morning editions which are more
suited to adult carriers who can use cars and deliver in the pre-dawn hours, and persistent concerns
about carrier safety and children's lack of insurance. Linder, supra note 9, at 72; see also Gyles, supra
note 25 at 43.
31. Linder, supra note 9, at 73; see also Gyles, supra note 25, at 43.
32. Linder, supra note 9, at 74.
33. Historically, such systems of compensating carriers actually did exist. Paperboys would typi-
cally collect money directly from subscribers and field complaints on a weekly basis. This practice,
however, has largely disappeared and pre-payment systems are now more the norm. Gyles, supra note
25, at 43.
34. Id. at 43.
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a very difficult time retaining newcarriers. Presstime reported that in 1996, the
NAA found that the average carrier turnover percentage was 51 percent, and
that "once carriers come on board, keeping them becomes the priority."3 5 The
article details the many methods publishers are employing to attract and retain
carriers, from giving bonuses to carriers who introduce friends and to carriers
who remain in service for several months, to forging connections with local
job-training nonprofits. 36 What is odd about these efforts, however, is that if
carriers are truly independent contractors, one would think that publishers
could simply write contracts spanning certain lengths of time that carriers
would not be able to terminate without breaching the contract. Indeed, in the
world of independent contractors, "retention" should not be a problem, while
breach of contract could be. The fact that publishers themselves have charac-
terized the problem as one of retention and attrition seems to offer further evi-
dence of the carriers' employee status.
As these examples demonstrate, the reality is that publishers wish to
maintain control over the work carriers do, but refuse to internalize the costs
that should go along with such control. Noticing this discrepancy, the IRS be-
gan cracking down on publishers in 1993, auditing and charging numerous
publishers with misclassification. 37 In response, the newspaper industry de-
cided to take the offensive, aggressively lobbying state legislatures and Con-
gress for laws to protect them from further scrutiny, as the next section de-
scribes.
"Fixing" The Internal Revenue Code to Define Newscarriers as Independent
Contractors
Dogged by the persistent IRS attacks on their misclassification practice,
the newspaper industry decided in 1996 to pursue a major change in federal
law. While they had been lobbying state legislatures for decades with variable
success to exempt themselves from state workers' compensation and benefits
fees, 38 the industry realized that a federal statute would most efficiently im-
munize them from further crackdowns by the IRS. Led by the Newspaper As-
sociation of America and with a cadre of well-seasoned lawyers, the industry
successfully lobbied Congress for an amendment to the minimum wage bill
35. Id. at 43.
36. Id. at 43.
37. Supra note 13.
38. A number of states have resisted the newspaper industry's lobbying, and have even crafted
statutes to unilaterally declare carriers employees. In 1935, Wisconsin made all newscarriers per se em-
ployees under the Workers' Compensation statute of their state. WIS. STAT. § 102.076 (Supp. 1996). In
1953, New York made all child carriers statutory employees. In 1971 and 1972, Maryland and Kentucky
respectively followed suit. However, the trend usually ran the other way: in 1931 and 1932, California
and New Jersey respectively declared that carriers were independent contractors. More recently in re-
sponse to vigorous lobbying by publishers, Arkansas, Montana, Washington, North Dakota, Georgia,
and Mississippi have followed suit. Linder, supra note 9, at 87-89.
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entitled, "The Small Business Job Protection Act."39 This Act established that
newscarriers, subject to certain minor restrictions, were categorically "direct
sellers," and hence not employees for federal employment tax purposes. Thus,
with the passage of the Act, the IRS could no longer go after publishers for in-
accurately characterizing carriers as independent contractors because their
hands were now tied by the new statute defining carriers as independent con-
tractors.
Looking closely at the substance of the bill, one can see many of the in-
dustry-propagated myths serving as its foundation. For instance, the bill calls
the carriers "direct sellers," perpetuating the idea that they are actually engaged
in selling the papers, rather than simply delivering them for the company. Fur-
thermore, the only requirements the bill places on the category of direct seller
are: (1) that the person "is engaged in the trade or business of the delivering or
distribution of newspapers," (2) that "substantially all the remuneration
(whether or not paid in cash) for the performance of the services ... is directly
related to sales or other output (including the performance of services) rather
than to the number of hours worked," and (3) that "the services performed by
the person are performed pursuant to a written contract between such person
and the person for whom the services are performed and such contract provides
that the person will not be treated as an employee with respect to such services
for Federal tax purposes., 40 In other words, two of the very devices that the
newspaper industry has designed to give the appearance of meeting IRS stan-
dards--(1) creating a compensation system that appears to pay carriers by the
piece while in truth paying them for time spent, and (2) having carriers sign
contracts which explicitly say they are independent contractors, whether or not
carriers fully understand the implication of such a statement-have been writ-
ten into law as the defining characteristics of the new IRS standard. Naturally,
such industry-tailored standards will serve to bar nearly all carriers from being
considered employees for federal employment tax purposes.
The legislative history of the bill is also rife with "little merchant" myths.
As the bill's legislative champion, Senator Phil Gramm, stated in legislative
hearings on the bill,
One of the reasons that I have taken on this paperboy issue with a very strong
commitment and zeal is that being a paperboy is one of the last jobs left where
young people are actually in business for themselves. They buy their newspapers
from the newspaper and then sell it to their customers. I bought 106 copies of the
Ledger-Enquirer from the local newspaper and delivered it to 106 residences and
businesses. I collected the money, as literally millions of paperboys have done since
the colonial period, and in the process not only did I earn money, but I learned
about how our market system works. I think it is vitally important that we not let
the Internal Revenue Service destroy this great educational and business system that
39. H.R. Con. Res. 3448, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
40. 26 U.S.C.S. § 3508(b)(2)(A)(iii), (2)(B), (2)(C) (2000).
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is available to young people all over America.41
Either employing the power of these myths or other political muscle, Gramm
was able to persuade his fellow legislators to write the Act into law. As a tell-
ing gesture of gratitude, the Newspaper Association of America rewarded
Senator Gramm soon after the Bill's passage by inducting him into the News-
42paper Carrier Hall of Fame.
With the passage of the Small Business Job Protection Act, the story that
newscarriers are independent contractors, at least for federal tax purposes, has
been ensconced into law. While newspaper companies can still be held liable
under state laws and for non-tax-related benefits, the IRS, the largest obstacle
to their misclassification practices, has been taken out of the game. As John
Murray, vice president of circulation marketing for the NAA, states, in the
wake of the federal legislation, "there is little interest in converting to employ-
ees.''43 Thus, in order to have a chance of combating these misclassification
practices--of creating an interest among publishers to convert carriers to their
rightful status as employees, advocates must begin exploring new strategies of
holding publishers accountable.
III. FIGHTING BACK: UTILIZING STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS TO HOLD
MISCLASSIFIERS ACCOUNTABLE
With the advent of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, news-
carriers can no longer count on the IRS to assist them in preventing employers
from misclassifying them as independent contractors and shirking the respon-
sibility owed to them as employees. Furthermore, other more traditional meth-
ods of recouping the benefits and tax contributions their employers have denied
them are of no assistance to the newscarriers. Federal and state employment
laws either do not allow workers a private right of action to hold employers li-
able for their statutory violations (e.g., there is no express private right of ac-
tion for employees to recover for an employer's non-payment of Social Secu-
rity, Unemployment Insurance, Worker's Compensation) or are subject to courtS44
rulings which exclude newscarriers from statutory protection.
41. 142 Cong. Rec. S7427 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
42. Texas Sen. Gramm Inducted into Newspaper Carrier Hall of Fame, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 15,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
43. Gyles, supra note 25, at 43.
44. See, e.g., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.v. Ratcliff, 141 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that al-
though the IRS had found that the carriers were employees under a common law test, the company did
not have to include them in their retirement and welfare benefits plans because the newscarriers had
signed their ERISA rights away in independent contractor agreements. The Court cited Boren v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co. 933 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991) as a controlling authority holding that personal
service contracts, such as the independent contractor agreements at issue, were evidence of a worker's
employment status, i.e., those who sign are independent contractors. Under Boren, the panel found no
reason to look beyond the strict language of the agreements, which the judges said clearly left the carri-
ers outside any rights to plan participation. In October 1998, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the
case.)
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Faced with these challenges, advocates have begun pursuing a new strat-
egy-utilizing state common law tort claims-in an effort to expose the fic-
tions that newspaper companies and other misclassifiers have erected to avoid
paying taxes and benefits. These common law claims seek to closely examine
the act of classification, exploring the knowledge that the companies may have
had about any false statements they made in the classification process, the fi-
nancial benefits a company may have accrued from the misstatements, and
whether misclassified employees were justified in relying on these misstate-
ments. This strategy has not yet been widely employed, so its effectiveness is
still largely unproven. But if it should prove successful in the several cases cur-
rently pending, using common law misrepresentation claims could become a
powerful tool for misclassified employees in all fields to combat misclassifica-
tion.
How exactly might such a strategy work? Below, I lay out the strategy's
general contours, highlighting the evidence needed to make successful claims.
I then identify the major objections defendants are likely to make to each
claim, and pose some possible responses to these objections. As a concrete ex-
ample of how this strategy is being used in practice, I present some of the
claims asserted in Robert McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., the case I
mentioned in the introduction. The case is currently being litigated, having
partially survived a motion to dismiss in trial court. Although the case is still in
the discovery phase and what results the trial will yield remain uncertain, in-
troducing some of the arguments presented by both sides and in the judge's
initial decision helps to illustrate the claims that misclassified employees in
similar situations can make, the legal obstacles they will face, and their poten-
45tial for success.
Claim One: Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Fraudulent misrepresentation claims are powerful tort law assertions that
a person or corporation has knowingly made statements that were false with
the intention of having the listener rely on the false information to the listener's
detriment. This claim can be used as a tool to fight misclassification in cases
where there is clear evidence that a misclassifier knew that what she was say-
ing was untrue. For instance, if one can show that an employer knew that a
worker would be working onsite but wrote in a contract that she would be
working offsite in order to make her seem more like an independent contractor,
45. This case is being litigated under Ohio common law. Like most other states, however, Ohio de-
rives much of its common law tort law from the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1977). Thus, while Ohio courts have put their own gloss on how claims made by Ohio citizens
should be adjudicated, the lessons learned from the Ohio experience may be applicable to newscarriers
and other misclassified employees litigating similar claims in other states. That said, other states may
have caselaw more or less favorable to successful misclassification claims.
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this would be a good example of fraudulent misrepresentation. It is not a claim
that can or should be made in every misclassification case, however: without
clear evidence of the maker's knowing deception, a plaintiff will not win such
a claim and may be better off simply pursuing a negligent misrepresentation
claim, where the person's explicit knowledge of the falseness of their statement
is not required (please see next section). A successful fraudulent misrepresen-
tation claim offers a plaintiff the potential for recovering damages beyond sim-
ple pecuniary losses: in certain cases, plaintiffs may be able to win punitive
damages from defendants. This potential for punitive damages may be an im-
portant consideration for advocates who wish to send a strong message to em-
ployers that such misclassification practices will not go unpunished.
The Elements of a Fraudulent Misrepresentation Claim
To make a successful fraudulent misrepresentation claim, a worker needs
to prove the following elements:
That the employer made a false representation to him concerning a fact material to
the transaction,
That the employer knew the falsity of this statement, or displayed utter disregard for
its truth,
That the employer intended to induce his reliance on the misrepresentation,
That he, the recipient of the information, justifiably relied on the information, AND
That he, the recipient of the information, was injured due to his reliance on the in-
formation.
46
Some states also have the additional requirement that the plaintiff assert this
claim "with particularity," namely specifying the time and place the false
statement was made and the person who made it.
47
In clear cases of misclassification, many of these elements should not be
hard to prove. The first element, that a false statement was made by an em-
ployer about a fact material to the transaction, can be substantiated by many of
the "Independent Contractor Agreement" contracts drawn up between workers
and employers. In a strong fraudulent misrepresentation claim, these contracts
will contain statements about the worker's responsibilities or activities that
clearly do not match up with reality. In the Ohio case, for example, the plain-
tiffs cite statements in their contracts which say that they will be sold newspa-
pers from the publisher which they are then to resell to subscribers. They then
point to substantial contrary evidence from their actual experience to prove the
falseness of these statements. For instance, they note in their complaint that the
46. This set of standards derives from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§525-26 (1977)
and has largely been adopted by most states.
47. See OHIO Civ. R. (9)(B).
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publisher sets the prices, determines how and when customers' papers should
be stopped for non-payment, must approve any communication between them
and the customers, and collects payment directly from customers-all strong
indications that the publisher is the true seller, in spite of its statements to the
contrary in the contract.48 The publisher's false statement that they are "re-
selling newspapers" is "material" to the "transaction" at hand, because it
strongly suggests that in the contractual transaction taking place, they, the
workers, are independent contractors.
The requirement that employers intend for the workers to rely on these
false statements can be proven by pointing to employer statements made orally
or in writing that the workers are independent contractors and as such, are re-
sponsible for paying their own taxes and ineligible for employee benefits. The
requirement that workers relied on this information and were injured due to
such reliance is fulfilled by the fact that, based on these employer statements,
they did not actually seek benefits or tax withholdings and were injured by be-
ing denied such provisions. Finally, the particularity requirement is also easily
satisfied if the misstatements are documented in the contract the worker has
dated and signed with the employer.
Challenges and Possible Solutions:
The harder elements of the claim to satisfy are the following, which de-
fendant-employers are likely to refute in their defense:
Proving that the employer knew that the statement was false,
Proving that a statement, though a statement of opinion, is still actionable as fraud.
Proving that the employer knew that the statement was false
A fraudulent misrepresentation claim requires a worker to prove that the
employer making the false statement actually knew that the statement was
false. Such a task is difficult; it involves verifying the employer's mindset and
intention, intangibles that are often hard to document, particularly with an un-
cooperative adversary. The person's knowledge and intention, or scienter, must
often therefore be proven through indirect evidence, such as demonstrating that
the statement involved facts that the employer must have known were false. An
example might be a case in which the employer denied in contract that the
company offered workers training when it was actually a well-known company
practice to train these workers, or as in the Ohio case, the company purported
in contracts to sell papers to carriers, while in truth, only gave papers to the
48. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 3-4, McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 2000) (Montgomery App. No. 98-3686) (on file with author).
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carriers to deliver. 49 Such examples strongly suggest scienter because they de-
scribe situations in which employers would have a hard time asserting that they
did not know such statements were false; in order to do so, they would have to
argue that they did not know their own company policies when writing the
contracts. Such situations, where the plaintiffs are able to gamer good indirect
evidence that the defendant knew the statements were false, have a solid
chance of winning a fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
More difficult claims are ones in which no evidence of the employer's
mindset, direct or indirect, is available. For example, the second claim the Ohio
newscarriers are advancing is that the very statement that carriers were inde-
pendent contractors was one that the employer knew to be false.50 To prove
this claim requires the carriers to demonstrate that the company definitively
knew that the carriers ought to be classified as employees but nevertheless
classified them as independent contractors. Potential evidence of such knowl-
edge could include memos from the employer's lawyer stating that newscarri-
ers appear to be employees or statements by the employer himself that carriers
are employees. Finding this type of proof, however, seems very unlikely so
such a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation holds less promise for success.
Proving that a statement, though a statement of opinion, is still actionable
as fraud
Defendants are also likely to assert that certain statements, while false, do
not expose the makers to charges of fraud because they are statements of
opinion rather than statements of fact. In Ohio, for example, the defendants
used this objection to challenge the claim that the employer's statement that the
carriers were independent contractors was a fraudulent false statement for
which they should be held liable.51 Such a statement, defendants argued, is not
a statement about a concrete fact, but is instead a statement of opinion about
the law, and therefore only actionable for fraud if a defendant purports to have
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 4.
51. The newscarriers in this case can argue the falsity of the statement that they were independent
contractors in spite of the Small Business Job Protection Act's statutory redefinition of carriers as inde-
pendent contractors for several reasons. To begin, the statutory redefinition only went into effect on
January 1, 1996; thus any statements made by publishers prior to this date are vulnerable to charges of
being false according to the IRS 20-factor test. Furthermore, the Small Business Job Protection Act only
redefines carriers as independent contractors with respect to federal employment tax purpose. In this
case, the carriers are seeking reimbursement for pecuniary losses of federal employment tax payments,
as well as of several other state and federal benefits such as retirement benefits, workers compensation
and unemployment benefits. These other benefits are not subject to the statutory redefinition of newscar-
riers, but utilize their own common law test of whether a worker is an independent contractor or not
(which is largely similar to the IRS test). Therefore, newscarriers can continue to assert that calling them
independent contractors with regard to these benefits is a false statement. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 2000) (Montgomery App. No. 98-3686).
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"special knowledge" about the subject.12 Because the publishers did not pur-
port to have this type of "special knowledge" about the legal status of newscar-
riers, they allege, their statement of opinion cannot be held against them even if
it is false.
Challenging this objection is a difficult task. Indeed, the presiding judge
in the Ohio case dismissed this fraud claim on these very grounds. Plaintiffs'
attempts to argue that it was reasonable for the carriers to assume that the pub-
lisher had superior knowledge about the legal status of newscarriers in the in-
dustry was rejected, as was the contention that by presenting all carriers with a
form contract stating they were independent contractors the publisher was ef-
fectively "purporting special knowledge" of this legal question. 53 As the judge
put it, "the mere use of form contracts in no way makes a representation of su-
perior or special knowledge on the part of the Defendants," and that "the
Plaintiffs may be presumed to know or have discovered [the appropriate legal
status of newscarriers] for themselves with reasonable diligence." 54 For these
reasons, the carriers were not justified in relying on the defendants' opinion
that they were independent contractors and therefore cannot assert this claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation.
While the Ohio ruling should make advocates aware of the possible perils
of asserting this claim, there are several possibilities for challenging this objec-
tion in future litigation. The first possibility is to rely on the Restatement por-
tion that gives weight to the form in which a statement is made. 55 According
to the Restatement §538A, a statement's form can help determine whether it is
a statement of fact or of opinion. As Comment b. of §538A explains:
A representation of fact is a positive assertion that the fact is true. It implies that the
maker has definite knowledge or information which justifies the positive assertion.
A representation of opinion, on the other hand, is only one of the maker's belief as
to the fact. It implies that he does not have definite knowledge, that he is not suffi-
ciently certain of what he says to make the positive statement, or at most, as stated
in § 539, that he knows of no facts incompatible with the belief, or that he does
know some facts that justify him in forming it. The difference is one between "This
is true," and "I think this is true, but I am not sure.",
56
Advocates may be able to argue that unequivocal statements by employ-
ers that workers are independent contractors, made in contracts or orally, are
52. Defendants rely on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §542 (1977) as a basis for this ar-
gument.
53. Decision, Order and Entry Overruling in Part and Sustaining in Part Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 6-7, McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., (Ohio Ct.
C.P.) (Montgomery App. No. 98-3686).
54. Id. at 7.
55. Most states derive much of their common law tort law from the American Law Institute's
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977), although their courts may have applied a unique interpreta-
tion to the Restatement language. Absent case law to the contrary, the Restatement provisions may be
authoritative.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §538 A cmt. b (1977).
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statements of fact, rather than statements of opinion. As evidence, they may
point to the form contracts that many workers are required to sign which state:
"This is an independent contractor agreement," 57 or to unwavering employer
descriptions of their status as independent contractors. Such statements do not
suggest that the designated independent contractor status is open to question,
not even through a nod in legalese to suggest that this status is a subjective de-
termination about which the workers might want consult a lawyer. Because the
form and nature of these statements suggest that they are unquestionable, a
plaintiff may be able to convince a court to treat them as statements of fact,
rather than as non-actionable statements of opinion.
Another possibility for recovery on this claim is through a theory of im-
plied fact. Even if a court insists that a statement is a statement of legal opin-
ion, this theory still allows recovery if the legal opinion implies a set of false
underlying facts. As Comment c of §545 of the Restatement explains:
Even though the language of a representation concerns only legal consequences and
is in form an expression of opinion, it may, as in the case of any other statement of
opinion, carry with it by implication the assertion that the facts known to the maker
are not incompatible with his opinion or that he does know facts that justify him in
forming it. (See § 539). Thus the statement that the maker has good title to land,
although in form one of a legal conclusion, ordinarily will be understood to assert
the existence of those conveyances or other events necessary to vest good title in
him. So likewise a statement that one mortgage has priority over another may imply
an assertion that one was made before the other; and a statement that a corporation
has the legal right to do business in a state may carry with it an assurance that it has
as a matter of fact taken all of the steps necessary to be duly qualified. When the re-
cipient does not know the facts, he may justifiably rely upon these implied asser-
tions and recover on the basis of a misrepresentation of the implied fact.
As this section describes, a plaintiff can justifiably rely upon even an expres-
sion of legal opinion if the opinion implies a set of underlying facts. According
to this logic, one could argue that even if an employer's statement that its
workers are independent contractors is a legal opinion, the opinion contains
within it the implicit factual assertions that the employer has taken steps to en-
sure that this designation is legal and accurate, or that the government has
clearly classified these workers as independent contractors. Because these im-
plied facts are false, workers can bring a fraud claim against the employer for
knowingly conveying such false facts and leading them to rely on them to their
detriment.
59
57. See, e.g., Exhibit C, Independent Contractor Distribution Agreement between DNI and Charles
Bunning, McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., (Ohio Ct. C.P. 2000) (Montgomery App. No. 98-3686)
(on file with author).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §545 cmt. c (1977).
59. This argument also finds support in comment d, which again discusses how the form a state-
ment takes can be dispositive. As comment d states, "A representation of law that might otherwise imply
assertions of fact may be so clearly a statement solely of opinion that it does not carry an implication of
fact. Thus one who says, 'I think that my title to this land is good, but do not take my word for it; con-
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Claim Two: Negligent Misrepresentation
Another possible tort claim misclassified workers can pursue is negligent
misrepresentation. This claim may be easier for plaintiffs to prove: unlike a
fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the negligent misrepresentation claim does
not require proof that a misstatement is a factual statement, that the misrepre-
senter purported to have "special knowledge" of the issue if the statement was
an opinion, or that the makers knew the statement was false. The threshold is
lower, as described below. Additionally, while it does not grant a successful
plaintiff punitive damages, a negligent misrepresentation claim offers much of
the same satisfaction that a fraud claim does in taking a misrepresenter to task
for its loose adherence to the truth, and offering recovery to plaintiffs who have
been wrongfully denied tax withholdings and benefits.
The Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation Claim
For workers to make a successful negligent misrepresentation claim, they
must prove these following elements:
That false information was supplied for their guidance in business transactions by
someone in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he had a pecuniary interest,
That the supplier of the information failed to exercise reasonable care or compe-
tence in obtaining or communicating the information, AND
That they suffered a pecuniary loss caused by her justifiable reliance upon the in-
formation.
60
Similar to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, workers can point to
their contracts as evidence of false information, citing descriptions of their
work that are inconsistent with reality. The fact that such information was sup-
plied in contractual negotiations can fulfill the requirement that the information
is supplied "for their guidance in business transactions" and "in the course" of
their employer's business transactions. Alternatively, they can assert that their
employers had a pecuniary interest in having them sign contractual agreements
that inaccurately suggested that they were independent contractors because
such agreements saved the employers from paying their taxes and benefits.
Plaintiffs can then attempt to demonstrate that employers "failed to exercise
reasonable care in determining the truth and accuracy of the.. .information
obtained and communicated" by showing that the employer had reason to
suit your own lawyer,' is not reasonably to be understood as asserting any fact at all with respect to the
title." While this hypothetical offers an example of a statement that in format is so clearly an opinion
that it does not imply any facts, it also helps demonstrate the inverse-that representations of law that do
not make clear that they are opinions by including equivocal phrases like, "I think" or "do not take my
word for it," can reasonably be interpreted as implying assertions of fact.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); Delman v. Cleveland Hts., 41 Ohio St. 3d 1
(1989).
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doubt that the workers were independent contractors (e.g. if the employer had
been challenged by IRS with regard to the workers' status, as DNI had been,
61
or knew that the descriptions of the work did not match up so neatly with the
reality), but did nothing to communicate these potential discrepancies to the
workers. Finally, plaintiffs can satisfy the "pecuniary loss" standard by point-
ing to the tax payments they made that ought to have been made by employers
and to the work-related benefits that they have been denied.
Possible Objections and Solutions
The challenges defendants are likely to raise are the following:
That a person liable for negligent misrepresentation must be in the business of sell-
ing the false information (e.g. as a lawyer or an accountant) and that they, the de-
fendant company, were not in the business of selling the information,
That pecuniary interest in a transaction only exists when there is consideration paid
for the information received, and that since there was no consideration paid in this
transaction, there was no pecuniary interest,
That the Economic Loss Rule of Torts bars recovery for losses that are purely eco-
nomic, and losses of denied benefits and tax withholdings are purely economic.
The Misrepresenter must be in the business of selling the information that
was false
Defendant companies may assert that only individuals who are in the
business of selling information, such as lawyers and accountants, can be
charged with negligent misrepresentation. Such an argument was one of the
publisher's main objections in the Ohio case.
The likelihood of countering this objection will be largely dependent on
what the case law of a plaintiff's home state says. In Ohio, for instance, there
are four cases that discuss the relevant requirements that are likely to shape the
judge's assessment of negligent misrepresentation.62 These cases seem to offer
hope for a positive outcome for the Ohio newscarriers, revealing that while
negligent misrepresentation has typically been invoked successfully in cases
where misrepresenters were in the business of purveying information, this
characteristic is not a requirement for making such an assertion. Plaintiffs in
other states should similarly look to their case law to see whether "being in the
61. Letter from Stephen L. Daige, District Director, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
Service to Brett Thurman, General Counsel, Dayton Newspapers, Inc. (Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with
author).
62. The defendant in Ohio cites four cases to support their contention that there is a "requirement"
that the misrepresenter be in the business of supplying information: Harrell v. Crystal, 81 Ohio App.3d
515 (1992) (attorneys), Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 157, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982) (ac-
countants), Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc. 22 Ohio St.3d 286, 288-89 (1986), and Nichols v. Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc. (June 23, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65376, unreported, at 4.
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business of selling information" is not a requirement for the claim, but rather
merely a standard scenario.
If a state's case law does not help clarify the issue, plaintiffs can also turn
to the Restatement §552 Comments and Illustrations for further assistance.
Nowhere in the text of the comments is there language limiting misrepresenters
to individuals in information-dispensing industries. Instead, the comments only
limit claims to "information [provided] in connection with a commercial trans-
action... in which the maker was manifestly aware of the use to which the in-
formation was to be put and intended to supply it for that purpose." 63 There-
fore, any company that was "manifestly aware" that their workers would use
the contractually-provided information, that they were independent contractors
so as to not demand work-related benefits or an employer tax contribution, and
that they intended to supply the information for this purpose, fits this definition
of "commercial transaction." §552's illustrations also seem to cut against as-
sertions that only misrepresenters who supply information in their line of busi-
ness can be charged with negligent misrepresentation. Several cases from a va-
riety of states cited in the Restatement offer counter-examples: in Virginia
Dare Stores v. Schuman, the court holds that a store owner can be found liable
for negligently misrepresenting the safety of standing on a countertop to a win-
dow cleaner, and in Devore v. Hobart Mfg. Co., the court holds that a school
could have been held liable for negligently misrepresenting the name of a
steamer manufacturer to their injured employee if her reliance had been fore-
seeable. 64 These cases illustrate that makers of negligent misrepresentations
need not be professional purveyors of expert information: they simply need to
be individuals who provide false information in the course of their business
knowing that the recipient will rely on that information.
Pecuniary interest only exists when there is consideration paid for the
information received.
Defendants may.also attempt to assert, as the Ohio defendants did, that
based on the Restatement §552, a person only has a pecuniary interest in a
transfer of information in which he receives "consideration paid to him for [the
information] or pain in a transaction in the course of and as a part of which it is
supplied., 65 Therefore, if defendants did not receive any consideration in ex-
change for the false information they provided to the workers, they did not
have a pecuniary interest in the transaction.
The Restatement may again be helpful to plaintiffs faced with such an
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552, cmt. a (1977).
64. Virginia Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287 (1938); see also Devore v. Hobart Mfg. Co.,
367 So.2d 836 (La.1979).
65. Defendants' Reply Memorandum at 9 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552 cmt.
c. and cmt. d (1977)).
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objection. As the court in the Ohio case points out in its ruling, the Defendants
conveniently "neglect[ed] to cite the very next sentence of the Restatement
portion, which reads: '[The pecuniary interest] may, however, be of a more in-
direct character.' 66 In other words, consideration is not a necessary indicator
of pecuniary interest in the transaction: pecuniary interest can be indicated in
other ways. The Ohio court goes on to state that the "payment of various taxes"
by the carriers, as well as the Defendant's ability to "avoid having to provide
retirement, health and workers' compensation benefits," could constitute suffi-
cient pecuniary interest. 67 Hence, the Restatement and the Ohio case both
seem to suggest that an employer denying a worker his rightful benefits and tax
withholdings constitutes sufficient pecuniary interest to make a negligent mis-
representation claim.
The Economic Loss Rule of Torts bars recovery for losses that are purely
economic.
Defendants may also offer as a final argument that the "economic loss
rule" of torts bars recovery for purely economic losses in misrepresentation
cases. In Ohio, for example, the Defendants cited several state and federal
cases as holding that "[i]n the absence of injury to persons or damage to prop-
erty, economic losses cannot be recovered in tort."
68
Depending on the case law of the state where the case is brought, this last
objection may also be countered with support from case law and Restatement
citations. Ohio's case law, for example, offers a mixed reading. Some Ohio de-
cisions militate for granting recovery while others invoke the economic loss
rule. Workers will need to assess the utility of their state's case law on the eco-
nomic loss rule. The Restatement, however, seems to offer strong support for
misclassified workers. For example, §552(1) expressly states that a party may
be liable for "pecuniary loss caused" by justifiable reliance upon false infor-
mation supplied. In other words, since the Restatement effectively requires that
a person suffer pecuniary loss as a result of receiving false information in order
to plead negligent misrepresentation, it would be quite strange for it to then bar
recovery for those very required pecuniary losses. Moreover, the Restatement
itself specifies that pecuniary losses should be offered as damages in both
fraudulent misrepresentation69 and negligent misrepresentation cases. 70 It
66. Decision, Order and Entry Overruling in Part and Sustaining in Part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, 9, McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. (Ohio Ct. C.P.
2000) (Montgomery App. No. 98-3638) (on file with author), quoting Restatement Section 552(1), cmt.
C.
67. Id.
68. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, 7-8,
McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. (Ohio Ct. C.P. 2000) (Montgomery App. No. 98-3638) (on file
with author).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §549 (1977).
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would make no sense for the Restatement to lay out these damages for eco-
nomic losses if it meant for the economic loss rule to bar any recovery.
4!* ** *
These two tort law claims-fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent
misrepresentation-offer a new, potentially useful tool for workers and advo-
cates seeking to hold accountable employers who misclassify their workers.
While each claim has its pitfalls and the case law of different states may offer
workers greater or lesser relief, the arguments laid out above present a starting
point for workers who wish to try litigating these claims. Advocates are also
currently exploring the common law claims of constructive contract, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, unconscionabil-
ity, constructive fraud, and contracts of adhesion as other potential avenues for
stopping the misclassification trend.71 With time, this web of state law claims
may create a strong incentive for employers to stop misclassifying workers and
thereby denying them the benefits and treatment to which they are entitled.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this world of intense global competition, employers are constantly
looking for ways to cut costs, even if the company's gains mean losses of
wages and benefits for workers. The temptation to avoid paying taxes and
benefits through the simple act of relabeling workers as independent contrac-
tors will always exist. The only bulwark that workers have against such mis-
treatment are laws and regulation that shut down these possibilities: laws that
compel employers to pay a minimum wage, to take responsibility for their
workers' on-the-job injuries, and to acknowledge that workers whose labor
they control are indeed their employees.
Using state common law tort claims may become a powerful way to force
employers to own up to the responsibilities they have been shirking. Fraudulent
and negligent misrepresentation claims can draw attention to employers' mis-
classifications and compel employers to prove that the reality of how they treat
workers actually meets the independent contractor label they have attached to
the relationship. While such scrutiny may only drive certain publishers to be-
come even more savvy about concealing the true status of carriers, it may per-
suade other employers to end their engagement in the misclassification game.
The newspaper industry has been a leader in this misclassification prac-
tice. And while newscarriers have been the main victims of misclassification,
publishers are extending the practice to editorial stringers, office cleaning
70. Id. at §552B ("The damages recoverable for a negligent misrepresentation are those necessary
to compensate the plaintiff for the pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepresentation is a legal
cause...").
71. Laurence E. Norton 1I & Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Misclassification by Employers Violates
the Common Law (2000) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
Vol. 19:489, 2001
Newscarriers: Employees or Contractors
workers, and the individuals who perform grounds maintenance. As noted be-
fore, many other industries are following their lead. The spread of this practice
speaks to the urgent need for workers' rights activists to wage a vigorous cam-
paign against newspaper companies and other misclassifiers by countering
their marketing strategies with the truths of workers' lives, lobbying legisla-
tures for better laws, and finding states with sympathetic law for litigating mis-
representation claims. Stopping a leader like the newspaper industry will send
a strong message to other industries that misclassification is not a permissible
strategy for cutting costs and avoiding labor standards, and that they must treat
their workers as what most of them truly are--employees.

